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Summary of the case
After a lengthy process the Danish Supreme Court finally closed the curtain in September 2015 on a
potential new, and competing, terminal in Copenhagen Airport, the main Danish airport hub. A
group of investors had asked the airport to grant access (a lease) to a plot of land in the airport for
the purpose of building a new terminal A. Terminal A would compete with the airport in the supply
of services to airlines. Copenhagen airport rejected the request which in turn lead the group of
investors to complain to the Danish Competition and Consumer Authority ("DCCA"). In its draft
decision the DCCA identified an obligation to grant access under EU Article 102 and the Danish
equivalent. However, just before a formal decision was to be made on the matter by the DCCA, the
Danish Transport and Construction Agency reversed a previous finding now holding air security
regulation to be an obstacle to the application of competition law to the matter at hand. Unhappy,
not only with the outcome, but also the process, the access seeking party, Terminal A, lodged a case
before the judiciary arguing that air security regulation did not prevent the application of
competition law and an order for the granting of access. This submission was not accepted by the
Danish Supreme Court that moreover held EU Article 106 (2) to be applicable as a defence for
Copenhagen Airport’s refusal to lease the land to Terminal A. The case provides guidance on the
scope of the state action defence under Danish competition law and, indirectly the application of EU
Article 102 and the Danish equivalent to refusal to supply cases.
Background of the case and its long march to the Supreme Court
Presently, Copenhagen Airport is the sole provider of the full spectrum of core airport related
services, including terminal services to air operators and their passengers. Since early 2008 a group
of investors, using the brand Terminal A, had been contemplating to set up a competing terminal in
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Copenhagen Airport for the purpose of offering a cheaper alternative to the existing vertically
integrated operator. The project Terminal A required access (a lease) to a plot of land within the
fence surrounding the airport. Moreover, terminal A would need to be linked to the remaining
terminals allowing passengers to access connecting flights. For obvious reasons Copenhagen airport
had limited interest in any leasing arrangements and moreover would have to assume security
responsibility for the activities of Terminal A. Following unsuccessful discussions the investors
logged a complaint with the DCCA in August 2008 arguing that two vertically linked markets could
be identified; an upstream market for the leasing of land within the airport area and a downstream
market for the offering of terminal services. Access to the second market could only be secured
through the first market. Therefore, the refusal of grating access constituted an infringement of
Article 102 and the Danish equivalent. Copenhagen Airport therefore should be ordered to grant
access in the form of a lease of the plot of land in question.
Proceedings before Competition Authority – An infringement decision never delivered
Before carrying out its analysis of the matter, the DCCA contacted the Danish Transport and
Construction Agency, the agency responsible for regulatory oversight of the air transport sector
including Copenhagen Airport, for the purpose of clarifying any air security regulatory obstacles to
the Terminal A project. Following some discussions between the DCCA and the Danish Transport
and Construction Agency the latter came to the preliminary conclusion in May 2010 that air security
regulation neither precluded the tabled project nor made competition law inapplicable. For
background; under Danish competition law ’immunity’ from the application of competition law is
allotted to restrictions of competition which are a direct or necessary consequence of public
regulation. This ’immunity’ provision mirrors, but is broader in scope, than the state action defence
under EU Article 106. Moreover, the power to decide whether the ’immunity’ provision is applicable
does not rest with the DCCA but with the responsible Minister (in the present matter the Minister of
Transport and Building), that however, normally would either delegate to or coordinate the position
with the designated sector regulator. Consequently, in light of this preliminary conclusion of the
Transport and Construction Agency, the DCCA decided to pursue the matter further, including
reviewing the refusal under EU Article 102 and the Danish equivalent. Furthermore, the preliminary
decision by the Transport and Construction Agency of May 2010 was ’converted’ into a final decision
in January 2011, allowing the DCCA to open a formal Article 102 case against Copenhagen Airport
with the aim of rendering a final decision on the matter before the end of 2011 or early 2012.
In what hardly can be described as nothing short of the 11th hour, the Danish Transport and
Construction Agency in December 2011 reversed its decision of January 2011, now identifying
material regulatory obstacles for the Terminal A project. More importantly, these regulatory
obstacles also precluded the DCCA from pursuing the case further under competition law as the
Danish Transport and Construction Agency now considered competition law inapplicable to the
matter. Consequently, the DCCA had to close its case without a formal decision. Apparently
somewhat discontent with the late U-turn by the Transport and Construction Agency, the DCCA in
January 2012 sent its 267-pages draft decision [1] setting out its reasons for finding an infringement
of EU Article 102 and the Danish equivalent to the Ministry of Transport and Building
recommending amendments to the existing air security regulation. [2]
Proceedings before the judiciary – the mysterious U-turn
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Equally discontent, as the DCCA, were of course the Terminal A investors. Perhaps encouraged by
the draft decision of the DCCA, identifying an obligation to let the plot of land in question, and the
ambiguous approach to the matter by the Transport and Construction Agency, legal action before
the Danish High Court was taken to challenge the December 2012 decision. The challenge was
based on the decision being “wrong” and consequently, null and void, and in violation of Terminal
A’s legitimate expectations as to the outcome of the matter raised by the ’favourable’ January 2011
decision.
Before the Danish High Court could rule on the matter the Danish Transport and Construction
Agency decided to reverse its position once again, now deciding that it had no final position on the
substance matter of the case, but needed further time to consider the issue. Consequently, the
Danish High Court dismissed the case in June 2014. [3] This decision by the High Court to dismiss
the case was appealed to the Danish Supreme Court, the highest judicial instance in Denmark.
Moreover, in July 2015 the Danish Transport and Construction Agency and the Ministry of Transport
and Building, replied to the January 2012 letter from the DCCA, confirming the January 2011
decision by referring to material practical and regulatory obstacles to granting access as requested
by Terminal A. Moreover and as a consequence competition law was not applicable to the matter at
hand. With the final position of the Danish Transport and Construction Agency and the Ministry of
Transport and Building having been established, the Danish Supreme Court could proceed to hear
the arguments of the parties in September 2015 and deliver a ruling the same month.
In its ruling the Danish Supreme Court [4] makes three notable and clear conclusions:
1) Firstly, the Supreme Court found that the January 2011 decision by Danish Transport and
Construction Agency did not create any legitimate expectations for the Terminal A investors as the
decision was ’directed’ to the DCCA and not to the investors. Moreover, the decision of the
Transport and Construction Agency was subject to further consideration of a number of factors and
therefore clearly of a preliminary nature. Consequently, it was from a legal perspective
unproblematic that the Danish Transport and Construction Agency eventually took a different view
on the security regulation issue than first indicated.
2) Secondly, the Supreme Court held the July 2015 decision of the Danish Transport and
Construction Agency and the Ministry of Transport and Building, finding competition law
inapplicable due to regulation, to be neither unreasonable nor unmerited as the Danish airport
regulation does not allow for separate and independent operators of terminals. Under Danish airport
regulation, reflecting the EU directive in the field, [5] a single entity is entrusted with the task of
offering core airport services including operating terminals. Moreover, substantial practical issues
would emerge in the event that a second operator was allowed into the airport e.g. in relation to
airport security issues and division of responsibilities. In the specific case a two-party relationship
had been established between Copenhagen Airports and the Danish Transport and Construction
Agency that did not facilitate the setting up of a competing terminal, as Terminal A, outside the
control of Copenhagen Airport. Changes to this arrangement would need to be obtained through
discussions and negotiations between the parties involved. Although this is not articulated in the
judgment, there would appear to be a reluctance to replace such discussions and negotiations with a
competition law-based argument for ordering a change of the existing arrangement.
3) Thirdly; in light of the special tasks vested upon Copenhagen Airport its refusal to lease out the
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plot of land to Terminal A could be categorised under Article 106 (2), thereby also providing cover
against Article 106 (1) arguments. This third point of the judgment is interesting. A significant part
of the parties’ oral submissions were focused on this point.
Consequently, Terminal A’s claim was dismissed and the curtain finally drawn on further legal action,
referring the parties to seek either a negotiated settlement or push for political intervention. As an
interesting detail; in light of the late reply to the request from the DCCA, and perhaps also the
U-turns, all parties were ordered to cover their own cost, including the winning parties. Under
Danish law the loosing parties would normally be ordered to compensate the winning parties and
cover their costs.
Comments on the case and possible interpretations
The case could in fact be viewed as two equally interesting cases: One case on the state action
defence in Danish competition law and one case on the refusal to supply doctrine under Danish
Competition law. Below comments on both issues are offered including substantial discussions of the
legal analysis by the DCCA and the refusal to supply issue. [6]
The state action defence in Danish competition law
Under Danish competition law ’immunity’ is allotted to restrictions originating from other regulation.
Such ’immunity’ prevents the DCCA from applying competition law including EU competition law.
The ’immunity’ provision mirrors EU Article 106 but is broader in scope [7]; not only does it offer full
’immunity’ even where a commercial freedom has been restricted but in addition the ’immunity’
exception is also not subject to proportionality requirements as seen in EU practice. Perhaps even
more notable is the fact that the power to decide whether the ’immunity’ exception can be relied
upon rests with the responsible ministry. The DCCA must respect the minister’s decision and its only
course of action is to make a recommendation to the minister for amendments of the legislation in
question. [8] As the ’immunity’ exception is neither subject to review by the DCCA nor any
proportionality test there is no defence comparable to Article 106 (2) in Danish competition law. This
defence would be considered ’internalized’ into the immunity system. However, Article 106 (1)
remains applicable allowing the EU Commission or a Danish court to review a matter and in
principle find an infringement making the Article 106 (2) discussion relevant in relation in this
scenario.
In its review of the July 2015 decision the Danish Supreme Court demonstrated a high level of
willingness to check the substance matter of a ’immunity’ decision including practical obstacles such
as security issues and whether national and EU regulation singles out terminal services as separate
from other (core) airport activities. In finding that this was not the case, and in light of the
concession granted to Copenhagen Airport further vested rights and obligations upon the airport
(including the right to decide on the expansions of terminals), the July 2015 decision was upheld. As
a consequence of this competition law was considered inapplicable. As mentioned, the Court did not
rest there but also concluded that as a consequence of the special obligations vested upon
Copenhagen Airport, and the air security issue, Copenhagen Airport’s decision not to let the land
could be subsumed under Article 106 (2) thereby closing the curtain on any EU Article 106 (1)
discussions. An interesting conclusion as there is no analysis on the application of Article 106 (1) in
the ruling. The decision by the Danish Supreme Court to address the Article 106 (2) point without a
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lengthy analysis on Article 101 (1) gives rise to different possible readings. One, perhaps less likely,
reading is that the Danish Supreme Court will automatically consider Article 106 (2) in relation to
any decision on the non-application of competition law due to regulation. Another, and perhaps more
plausible reading, is that the Danish Supreme Court ex officio found it necessary to consider Article
106 in light of the nature of the strict security regulation of the activities in question. As no
reasoning is provided in the judgment, it is not possible to come to a clear conclusion on this point.
However, despite a clear decision from the Danish Transport and Construction Agency and the
Ministry of Transport and Building, precluding the DCCA from reviewing the matter, both parties
felt compelled to defend their respective positions before the Supreme Court by offering substantial
evidence and arguments about the relevant practical and regulatory circumstances, e.g. on security.
This indicates that the second reading of the case is more plausible and thereby also that the
judgment should be read to limit the public authority’s scope under Danish law to make competition
law inapplicable. This would be welcome as existing precedents are somewhat ambiguous and
uncoordinated across sectors and areas of activities. In line with this the OECD [9] recently
recommended Denmark to consider changing the law and to adopt a clearer and coherent approach.
The draft decision from the DCCA
As a consequence of the U-turns of the Danish Transport and Construction Agency no final decision
were rendered on the substance matter by the DCCA. However, the draft decision of November 2011
and covering 267 pages offers some interesting insight into how the case could have ended had the
DCCA been allowed to proceed to formal decision.
Firstly, the draft decision’s product market definitions and finding of Copenhagen Airport as a
dominant player involves some interesting considerations. The DCCA starts by making a distinction
between primary and secondary airports – the latter being regional airports - followed by identifying
a third category of airports predominantly relevant for ’taxi’ flights and flight schools. [10] Primary
airports are normally located next to a major city (e.g. Copenhagen) and service direct and transfer
customers, while secondary airports normally are found outside the major cities offering a cheaper
alternative to the primary airports or focusing on regional customers and transport. Moreover a
possible distinction is considered between point-to-point traffic - where only airports within a limited
geographical area are an option for the traveller - versus transfer traffic where also more distant
airports could be substitutes [11] and for which the primary airports serve as hubs. Of more direct
relevance for the Terminal A case the DCCA identifies a number of vertically and horizontally linked
products markets [12] including a) ground handling, b) aeronautic services and c) commercial
services. Ground handling services (a) have specifically been subject to unbundling regulation [13]
and hence subject to competition. Commercial services (c) are services such as tax free shopping,
parking, restaurant services etc., normally served by third party under a lease agreement with the
airport, and hence also open to competition. By contrast aeronautic services (b) such as offering
landing strip services, directing and parking of planes, providing terminal space and security
services, fall within the core activities of an airport. Historically these services have been provided
by the airport as the services are associated with the actual traffic control (i.e. directing airplanes
between airports and landing and taking off). However, the actual traffic control services are
normally supplied by a governmental entity operating within and separate from the airport.
The described market definitions in the DCCA’s draft decision are in line the EU precedents [14] and
perhaps more importantly also accepted as correct by market participants, including Copenhagen
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Airport. However, the DCCA then moves on and sets out a somewhat unclear distinction between: [
15]
a) the provision of so-called landing strip services. Landing strip services are aeronautic services
and are described by the DCCA as access to and use of infrastructure. The landing strip services are
services to airlines (and their passengers) encompassing access to (and use of) of the landing strip
for landing, take-off, parking of aircrafts and access roads as well as the provision of security
measures in connection with the landing strips, and
b) the provision of terminal services. Terminal services are both aeronautic and commercial services.
Terminal services are services to airlines (and their passengers) which are also customers of landing
strip services. Terminal service encompass (i) (access to) the terminal building (the "shell"), letting
of space in the terminal to restaurants and shops [16], (iii) (access to and use of) facilities in the
terminal by the airlines, (iv) (use of) baggage facilities, (v) (use of) check-in counters as well as
self-service check-in facilities, (vi) the provision of IT services to airlines and (vii) parking.
The DCCA notes that a pre-condition for providing terminal activities is to have access to the landing
strips. This can be achieved by obtaining access through the leasing of a plot of land from the airport.
Copenhagen Airport argued in favour of an alternative product market definition, namely to view the
provision of landing strip and terminal service as one single service market rather than separate
upstream and downstream markets. [17] To counter the market definition suggested by Copenhagen
Airport and in support of its own market definition the DCCA referred to domestic and non-domestic
examples e.g. New York (JFK) where a third party had at least been considered to be allowed to
operating a competing terminal, [18] making it possible to distinguish two clearly separate service
markets, currently bundled by Copenhagen Airport. Moreover, the draft DCCA decision included
references to 2008 and 2009 UK studies [19] contemplating pro and cons of allowing for or
mandating independent terminals. Lastly, the draft DCCA decision noted that freight carriers, also
operating out of Copenhagen Airport, do not request terminal services, only airport facilities, [20]
which would indicate two separate products.
While not discussed directly before the Danish Supreme Court the Danish Transport and
Construction Agency and the Ministry of Transport and Building did not appear to agree with the
arguments advanced by the DCCA in this regard. In contrast both the agency and the ministry
essentially argued in favour of viewing the services offered by Copenhagen Airport as a single
integrated product and furthermore argued that the market had no room for specialized operators of
terminal services. Moreover, in their submissions the agency and the ministry referred to the
’market definitions’ or market description methodology in the EU directives in the field. Of course,
these arguments as regards market definition do not bind the DCCA. Moreover, competition law
must always be applied to the actual market circumstances at hand. However, presuming the
arguments of the Danish Transport and Construction Agency and the Ministry of Transport reflect
market realities, it does indicate the single integrated product market as the ’correct’ market
definition - also under competition law – which in turn would indicate a flaw in the draft decision. As
no final decision was rendered, the issue remains somewhat unresolved.
Secondly, in relation to the geographical scope of the market in question the DCCA opens by
concluding that it would not be relevant to consider alternative supplier of airport facilities in
Copenhagen Airport, as there would be none, but rather alternative airports - which compete with
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Copenhagen Airport for passengers and air carriers. [21] In the specific case Terminal A was only
interested in servicing point-to-point traffic, and not transfer traffic, making it relevant to consider
different secondary airports in Denmark as alternatives from a passenger perspective. Based on
extensive customers surveys it was concluded that Copenhagen Airport attracts passengers from
Greater Copenhagen, the surrounding islands and Southern Sweden but not passengers from the
region of another major Danish airport (Billund) located approximately 250 km from Copenhagen. [
22] This part of the analysis involved estimating that passengers were willing to travel up to 97
minutes which was somewhat less than the 2 hour accepted in some of the previous EU precedents.
Against this background Copenhagen Airport were held to be dominant with an overall market share
calculated on the basis of users/passengers of between 90.7 % and 100 % depending on the inclusion
or exclusion of some of the secondary airports. [23]
Thirdly, and perhaps most interestingly, the DCCA identified an infringement of EU Article 102 and
the Danish equivalent. While this to some extent could be considered as a ’mechanical’ consequence
of having identified two separate product markets and having identified Copenhagen Airport as
holding a (super) dominant position, this is done with a ’twist’ by the DCCA. Copenhagen Airport is
the only property owner ’within the fence’ surrounding the airport. However, the airport’s core
activity is not the letting of property but the offering of what in the case is referred to as aeronautic
services. Moreover, the offering of aeronautic services (in contrast to leasing out property) can
reasonably be considered the core activity of all commercial airports, as the directing of flights at
landing and take-off normally would be managed by a government entity, making all other services
of an auxiliary nature. In contrast to ’traditional’ refusal to supply cases, Copenhagen Airport
therefore did not foreclose a potential downstream or upstream competitor for the purpose of
reserving an auxiliary market for itself but rather a direct competitor. The refusal to supply could be
said to have a horizontal scope rather than the traditional vertical foreclosure.
It is not clear if this element was separately considered by the DCCA or whether- perhaps influenced
by the fact that EU practice remains somewhat unsettled on the matter – the DCCA did not consider
this as material. The draft decision makes no references to the distinction between horizontal versus
vertical foreclosure indicating that the DCCA decided not to address this point. In support of finding
an abuse the DCCA then cites [24] the fundamental principles originating from Telemarketing [25]
that a dominant undertaking cannot reserve an ancillary activity on a neighbouring but separate
market for itself. Having established this additional substantive analysis on the abuse point is
provided using the principles of other EU cases such as Microsoft [26] and Bronner [27] including
the condition of two separate markets of which one can be considered as essential for the access to
the other giving rise to a substantial risk of foreclosure in the absence of alternative supplies. [28]
By contrast the DCCA did not make reference to EU cases such as BP [29] and United Brands [30]
that would indicate that a dominant undertaking has a right to defend its interests against a direct
competitor. Based on these cases a distinction between vertical and horizontal refusals to supply
could have been made. If this distinction had been accepted and followed the Terminal A case would
most likely have had to been assessed under the latter and more restrictive doctrine. [31] As no final
decision was rendered on the case, it remains unclear how the case eventually would have ended op.
This deprives us of a potentially very interesting precedent, in particular if the European Court of
Justice had been asked to provide guidance on whether a distinction should be made between
vertical and horizontal refusals to supply under Article 102. In the absence hereof it does, however,
appear to be the opinion of the DCCA that no such distinction should be made.
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As a fourth element of its analysis the DCCA undertook a substantial review of the potential
consumer benefits from Terminal A being granted access [32] including the potential consequences
for Copenhagen Airport’s future prices and investments. However, the DCCA specifically noted that
this element is neither required nor sufficient to identify an abuse. Nevertheless it is interesting that
the DCCA included this element in its analysis.
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